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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS - AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

Crappsv. Duval County HospitalAuthority, 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970)
Plaintiffs moved to Jacksonville, Florida and applied for free medical
care based upon their status as indigents. Medical care was refused solely on the
basis that the plaintiffs had not resided in Duval County for one year preceding their application. This residency requirement was established by a state
statute of local application that precluded any medical treatment for indigents
with less than one year of residency in Duval County., Plaintiffs brought suit
alleging this action to be a denial of rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida HELD, the
residence statute unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against
further enforcement of the statutory residency requirement.2
Residency requirements date from English feudal society. The first laws
dealing with residence were embodied in the Elizabethan Poor Laws,' which
were aimed at reducing the welfare burden and provided than any person
chargeable to the community as a poor person, who did not have a forty-day
residence therein, could be "removed or passed on" to his place of settlement. 4
Under this concept each community had exclusive responsibility for the care
of its own poor. Thus, a distinction between local and foreign indigents developed; community support being granted to local indigents while foreign indigents were coerced to return to their place of settlement.
Because of the English practice of banishing undesirables to the American
colonies and the economic crises during the period, the colonists adopted
settlement laws similar to those of the English.5 Similarly, early welfare programs in America were locally financed and administered. These early
developments influenced the present welfare programs, which remain almost
completely under local or state control enabling local authorities to establish
the conditions and the benefits available. 6
1. Fla. Laws 1963, 63-1305, §21.
2. 314 F. Supp. 181, 184 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
3. 47 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601).
4. Poor Relief Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 12, §§1, 2 (1662).
5. Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q.
355, 356-58; Note, Welfare Residence Requirements: A Study in Due Process and Equal

Protection, 31 OHo ST. L.J. 371 (1970).
6. Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, IowA L. Rv. 1080,
1081 (1966). To a limited degree the Social Security Act continued the practice of requiring
a period of residency for public assistance. The Social Security Act of 1935 provided that
residence requirements would be allowed for state family-aid plans that disbursed federal

funds if the requirement did not exceed the acceptable maximum provided by Congress.
Social Security Act of 1935, §402(b), 49 Star. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §602(b)
(1964). Although Congress did not define an acceptable maximum, it stated it would not
reject any program that required a one-year residency or less. Id. Congress, itself, greatly

furthered the existence of residency provisions by enacting certain residency requirements
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Prior to 1966 residency requirements imposed by various states' welfare
programs received only two constitutional challenges. In 1822 a Massachusetts
court upheld a statute establishing a three-year residency period as a prerequisite to the attainment of "resident status" by a pauper.7 The second
constitutional challenge was brought against an Illinois statute that required
a three-year period of residency to qualify for public assistance. The Illinois
supreme court upheld the statute, finding it impaired no fundamental rights. 8
The court stated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
merely required that a classification be based upon real and substantial distinctions having a rational relation to the subject of the legislation. 9
In the instant case the court relied on Shapiro v. Thompson' ° to hold the
residency provision violative of the equal protection clause because the provision discriminated against one class of citizens based solely on residency."
Equal protection of the laws, required by the fourteenth amendment, does
not prevent the states from passing legislation that results in the classification
of persons.1 2 However, any classification must be reasonable, 18 not arbitrary,"
and rest upon some distinction having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation so that all persons similarly situated are treated
alike.15 A violation of the equal protection clause occurs when legislation
creates systematic inequality through: (a) classifications of persons causing
unequal treatment;' 8 or (b) actions resulting in systematic inequality in
treatment received by a definable group of persons.' 7 If the classification is
suspect, the criteria that explicitly or implicitly are used to classify the affected
groups must be analyzed.' 8 If the criteria show no taints of invidious dis-

for categorical assistance programs in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. §3-203
(Supp. I1, 1964).
7. Inhabitants of Rutland v. Inhabitants of Mendos, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 153 (1822).
8. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 I1. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
9. Id. at 565, 30 N.E.2d at 51.
10. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. Id. at 627.
12. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). See also Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065, 1076 (1969). Courts, where examining statutory classifications that are based upon
"suspect" criteria or that affect "fundamental rights," invoke a test that holds a denial of
equal protection to occur unless the classification is supported by a compelling governmental
interest. Korematso v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The compelling interest doctrine is a significant exception to the established practice of upholding a statute that is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.
13. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
14. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
15. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv. 341, 346 (1949).
16. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356, 368 (1886).
17. Id. at 374.
18. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). The application of
the equal protection clause is analyzed in depth in Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the FOQurfeenth Amendment, 83 HAxv.
L. Rxv. 7, 33-35 (1969).
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crimination, the case will be treated as one of substantive due process and
no violation of equal protection will result.19
Arguably, justifications that a state may claim for residence tests must qualify under the "compelling" interest standard.20 Residency provisions may be
justified by three alleged governmental interests: (1) the protection of welfare
assistance programs for those who have lived in the state for a year and have
contributed to the state's economy; (2) the need to establish the welfare
budget of the state; and (3) to deter "raiding" of welfare benefits by persons
2
who come solely to obtain higher welfare benefits. 1
In the instant case the court, in discussing the third governmental interest,
noted that the state could constitutionally enact criteria to determine the intent of indigents seeking free medical care. 22 The court found the present statute impermissible, however, since it established no such criteria, but created
an all-inclusive category of newcomers consisting of indigents who came
2
solely for higher benefits as well as those coming for other purposes.
The residency provision in the instant case established a non-rebuttable
presumption that those who have not satisfied the statutory period do not
have the present intent to make Duval County their permanent home and
that every such application for assistance came to the county solely for
higher welfare benefits. 24 In actual operation, the provision established two

separate classifications: (1) a delineation between old and new indigent residents based on the completion of one year's residence in the jurisdiction and
(2) the all-indusive joining of indigents who came to Duval County for
other purposes as distinguished from those who came for the sole purpose of
collecting higher benefits. The court found that the dissimilar treatment of
otherwise equal indigents was based on irrational distinctions and was prohibited by the equal protection clause. 25 No standards were found in the
residency requirement that could be effectively used to deny benefits only to
those indigents seeking higher benefits and not to those coming for other
28

reasons.
The instant opinion differed greatly from Shapiro in respect to transient
19. In other words, the challenged actions of the government will be invalidated only
if they are not rationally related to a proper governmental purpose. The actions may also
be invalid if they are so detrimental to some judicially favored interest as not to be
justified by whatever tendency they do have to advance a proper governmental end. E.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Where there is a noticeable degree of oppression or stigmatization, the inspection shifts to the balancing of the interests in the case. The
personal interests that are adversely affected by unequal treatment are balanced against the
compelling interests of the government. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S.

36 (1961).
20. 314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1970). See also Michelman, supra note 18, at 34.
For a discussion of the "compelling interest" doctrine see note 12 supra.
21. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-35 (1969).
22. 314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 184. See generally Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
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persons seeking higher benefits in another jurisdiction. The present court

indicated that the state could enact criteria "rationally related to the finding
of" the intent of indigents seeking welfare benefits, 27 while the decision in
Shapiro indicated that "a state may no more try to fence out indigents who

seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents in general." 2
Although the court did not base its decision in the instant case on the
constitutional right to travel it did indicate that the denial of medical benefits
may have infringed upon that right.29 The right to travel, although not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, has long been recognized as a
fundamental guarantee of national citizenship protected by the Constitution. 0
Statutory classifications that hinder this "fundamental right of migration"
are invalid unless necessary to advance a compelling state interest.8 1
While most right-to-travel cases are concerned with absolute proscriptions
on the freedom of movement, the vital question in contesting a residency
requirement for welfare assistance is whether an indirect and unintentional
burden on a citizen's right to travel is also prohibited. Since an indigent
is not barred from the state but is only denied welfare assistance for a
certain period, an extension of the right to travel doctrine must be made.82
The court did not make such an extension in the instant case, but chose
to base its decision on the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. In
basing its decision on equal protection the court deviated from the usual
application of the clause in cases concerning impermissible classifications. 83
Interests that have been previously identified as fundamental and therefore
deserving of special treatment under the equal protection clause include

27. Id.
28. 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969). However, the present court interpreted Shapiro as not
precluding the states from enacting "any criteria for determining the intent of indigents
seeking free medical care to reside in the community." 314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (MJ).Fla.
1970). The Crapps court noted: "Mhe standards for determining intent must be rationally
related to that ultimate fact, and any resulting classification must be shown to promote a
compelling state interest." Id.
29. 314 F. Supp. 181, 183 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
30. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941). See also Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONsrrrrIoN 162 (1956).
31. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1868) and Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870), the right to travel
was based on the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONsr. art. IV, §2. In Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872),
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment has been used to support
the right. Freedom of travel outside the United States was based on the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
32. The district court in Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D. Conn. 1967),
made such an extension by interpreting United States v. Guest, 383 US. 745, 760 (1966), as
proscribing even a discouragement of interstate travel.
33. Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
989, 1003 (1969).
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voting,34 procreation, 35 rights with respect to criminal procedure, 36 and
education3 As a result of the instant case, it may be ultimately viewed that
welfare benefits are now a fundamental right within the scope of the equal
protection clause. The residence requirement in the instant case denied
medical services to new Duval residents, while granting these same services to
otherwise equal indigents who qualified by residing in the county for at least
a year. Thus, it may be a citizen's right to welfare services, the right to
medical care, food, shelter, and clothing that emerges as fundamental in the
case.

The present case, along with Shapiro, could have an immediate impact
on other welfare programs in the state3 8 The potential ramifications may be
enormous. Although the majority in Shapiro took great pains to limit the
decision in that cases" the "compelling interest test" of equal protection may
now be extended into areas never before considered. Chief Justice Warren,
dissenting in Shapiro, warned of the multitude of situations that now must
be examined in light of the holding. 40 The validity of other state imposed
waiting periods or residence requirements is questionable. Statutes and
ordinances containing residency provisions may now be considered suspect if
the provisions are not rationally related to a compelling state interest.41
The present case may have its greatest effect in Florida by enabling large
numbers of migrant workers to obtain welfare benefits while working within
the state. These applicants must qualify in all other respects, but they no
longer need to reside in the jurisdiction for a designated period in order to
qualify for welfare assistance.
In holding the residency provision unconstitutional, the courts have
elevated the "right to welfare" to a fundamental right that is without precedent or constitutional support except for the broadening of the reasonable
classification test to establish a new right to food, shelter, and clothing for all
citizens. The court seems to have adopted this course in order to make welfare
programs compatible with the economic and social realities of the day.
Two primary consequences may be inferred from this decision. First, a
legislative or administrative agency may no longer set up classifications of
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
ments

Harper v. Virginia Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§409.205, .215, .225 (Supp. 1970) where the residency require.
in the statutes were noted to be similar to the residency requirements declared

unconstitutional in Shapiro.
39.
40.

394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).
394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (dissenting opinion).

41. Note, Poverty Law-Unconstitutionality of Residence Requirements for Welfare
Assistance, 48 N.C.L. RF-v. 399, 403 (1970). Examples in Florida of suspect residence require.
ments are: FLA. STAT. §470.08(1) (a) (1969) (provisions for embalmers); FLA. STAT.
§470.08 (2) (a) (b) (1969) (provisions for funeral directors); FLA. STAT. §475.17(2) (1969)
(provisions for real estate brokers): FLA STAT. §482.132 (1969) (provisions for pest control
operators); FLA. STAT. §473.08 (1) (1969) (provisions for public accountants); FLA. STAT.
§240.052 (2) (a) (c) (1969) (provisions for university students).
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